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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tions. Therefore, the tradition and the capability exist for the use of
name rotation.51 But, absent stronger evidence of the impact of posi-
tional bias, such a return to name rotation is not the responsibility of
the courts; it is the responsibility of the Minnesota Legislature. Surely
the Legislature will recognize that voters can identify their party's can-
didate through party labels, regardless of the position of the candidate's
name on the ballot. In an era when cynicism toward our political system
is widespread and has the potential to impair severely public participa-
tion in elections, the Legislature would do well to return to procedures
designed to enhance the integrity of the ballot election process.
Environmental Law-A BALANCING TEST ADOPTED UNDER
MERA-MPIRG v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762
(Minn. 1977).
An effort by the Minnesota Legislature in 1971 to protect, conserve,
and promote the best use of the state's natural resources resulted in the
passage of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA).' MERA
ballots without designation of party affiliation beside the candidates' names. See Act of
Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 675, art. I, § 3(1), 1959 Minn. Laws 1133 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 203A.21(1) (1976)). First ballot position was, and continues to be, rotated in the
nonpartisan general election contests. See Act of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 675, art. IV, § 34(1),
1959 Minn. Laws 1158 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 203A.35(1) (1976)). In contrast to ballot
positioning of candidates in nonpartisan general elections, candidates in partisan general
elections were arranged in the order of number of votes polled by their party in the last
general election. In first position was the party polling the largest number of votes. See
Act of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 675, art. IV, § 33(3) (current verson at MINN. STAT. § 203A.33(4)
(1976)). In 1973, ballot placement methods for state legislative contests changed when the
Legislature changed the status of elections for members of the state legislature from
nonpartisan to partisan. See Act of Feb. 20, 1973, ch. 3, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 2 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 203A.21(1) (1976)).
51. Despite the expanded use of voting machines, which in some respects impairs the
ability to attain perfect name rotation, the use of the machines can be adapted to effect
rotation. See State v. Board of Comm'rs, 39 Ohio St. 2d 130, 135, 136-37 & n.4,314 N.E.2d
172, 176-78 & n.4 (1974). For a discussion of Ohio's method of achieving ballot rotation
while using voting machines, see the discussion of State v. Board of Comm'rs, supra note
9.
1. Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 952, 1971 Minn. Laws 2011 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§
116B.01-.13 (1976)). For a comprehensive discussion of the origin and legislative history
of the Act, see Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 575
(1972). Discussion of actions brought under MERA in the first five years following its
enactment may be found in Bryden, Environmental Rights in Theory and Practice, 62
MINN. L. REv. 163 (1978).
The Legislature's policy under MERA is:
[T]o create and maintain within the state conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony in order that present and future genera-
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entitles all citizens to the preservation of natural resources2 by permit-
ting any person 3 to obtain injunctive relief from the pollution, impair-
ment, or destruction of protected resources.4 The Act does not, however,
set forth a standard for trial courts to use in determining whether harm-
ful conduct should be enjoined.5 The Minnesota Supreme Court in
tions may enjoy clean air and water, productive land, and other natural re-
sources with which this state has been endowed.
MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 (1976). MERA's statement of policy parallels the policy embodied
in the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act. See id. §§ 116D.01-.02. In particular, subdivi-
sion one of section 116D.02 states:
[Ilt is the continuing policy of the state government . . . to use all practicable
means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner
calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future genera-
tions of the state's people.
Id. § 116D.02(1).
2. MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 (1976) provides: "[Elach person is entitled by right to the
protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and other natural resources
located within the state and . . . each person has the responsibility to contribute to the
protection, preservation, and enhancement thereof."
3. MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(2) (1976) broadly defines "person" to include:
[Alny natural person, any state, municipality or other governmental or politi-
cal subdivision or other public agency or instrumentality, any public or private
corporation, any partnership, firm, association, or other organization, any re-
ceiver, trustee, assignee, agent, or other legal representative of any of the forego-
ing, and any other entity, except a family farm, a family farm corporation or a
bona fide farmer corporation.
The statute exempts the owner of a family farm from suit for farming or farm-related
activities. See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 309 Minn. 178, 185, 243 N.W.2d 316, 320
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Bryson II. This exemption, however, does not preclude an
individual owner of a family farm from bringing a suit under the Act. See County of
Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 224, 210 N.W.2d 290, 295 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Bryson I. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether a family farm as an entity
could bring an action. See id.
4. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03(1) (1976). Natural resources protected under MERA include
"mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and
historical resources." Id. § 116B.02(4). The Act also defines "pollution, impairment or
destruction" as:
[Any conduct by any person which violates, or is likely to violate, any environ-
mental quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, license, stipulation
agreement, or permit of the state or any instrumentality, agency, or political
subdivision thereof which was issued prior to the date the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur or any conduct which materially adversely affects
or is likely to materially adversely affect the environment; provided that
"pollution, impairment or destruction" shall not include conduct which vio-
lates, or is likely to violate, any such standard, limitation, regulation, rules,
order, license, stipulation agreement or permit solely because of the introduction
of an odor into the air.
Id. § 116B.02(5).
5. See MPIRG v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 782 & n.12 (Minn.
1977) (MERA does not prescribe elaborate standards to guide trial courts).
2
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MPIRG v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club' established such a standard.
The standard takes the form of a balancing test by which trial courts
can determine on a case-by-case basis whether an injunction should be
granted when no agency standards have been promulgated to assist in
the determination.
7
The plaintiffs, the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group and a
local citizens' organization," alleged that noise from the White Bear Rod
and Gun Club's trap-and-skeet shooting range would impair the quie-
tude of the area," and that lead shot falling onto wetlands would poison
the wildlife feeding on the nearby lake."' Local residents and expert
witnesses testified that excessive noise from the range disturbed resi-
dents and would be likely to disturb wildlife." The experts also stated
that lead shot, when ingested, would have a toxic effect upon water-
fowl."2
The trial court found that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie
case showing that the defendant's conduct would "materially adversely
affect" protected natural resources in violation of MERA. 3 Because the
6. 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977).
7. Id. at 782. This holding is not surprising in light of the court's language in Bryson I,
"Obviously, the legislature intended that there should be a balancing of ecological against
technological considerations through the Environmental Rights Act." 297 Minn. 218, 229,
210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (1973).
8. Hugo Electors Leading Progress (H.E.L.P.) was the local organization formed to
preserve Rice Lake. See 257 N.W.2d at 766 & n.5.
9. Id. at 766. MERA specifically includes quietude as a protected natural resource. See
MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(4) (1976). Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has found
a lake to be a protectable natural resource. See Corwine v. Crow Wing County, 309 Minn.
345, 361 n.3, 244 N.W.2d 482, 490 n.3 (1976).
10. 257 N.W.2d at 766-67. The White Bear Rod and Gun Club purchased 80 acres of
land located about 1300 feet south of the edge of Rice Lake and approximately one and
one-half miles east of the city of Hugo in Washington County. Peat marshes and brush
swamp surrounding the lake provided shelter and food for migratory waterfowl and other
wildlife. Land in the area was zoned farm-residential and neighboring landowners used
their property for farming, hunting, recreational, and residential purposes. See id. at 764-
65.
11. See id. at 770-77. The court tluoted extensively from the trial record, citing testi-
mony from both area residents and expert witnesses supporting the finding of the trial
court that it would be very difficult for the club to operate without materially degrading
the surrounding environment. See id. at 777. In its discussion of evidence supporting
plaintiffs' allegations, the court cited the testimony of three expert witnesses and at least
eight other witnesses. See id. at 770-76. The volume and weight of the plaintiffs' affirma-
tive testimony apparently was a significant factor affecting the majority's decision.
12. See id. at 777-80. Expert witnesses testified concerning the impact of poisoning from
lead shot falling onto wetlands near the lake and the effects of various methods that the
gun club might employ to remove that shot from the wetlands. See id. at 779-80. Based
on such testimony, the trial court found that ingestion of lead shot would affect waterfowl
and other wildlife and that lead shot could not be removed without substantial destruction
of the wetlands area. Id. at 780.
13. See id. at 780-81. The trial court applied the standards established by the supreme
court in the case of Bryson 1, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973). Compare 257 N.W.2d
[Vol. 5
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defendant failed to rebut the prima facie case'4 and further failed to
raise the affirmative defense permitted under MERA,1 5 the trial court
permanently enjoined the defendant from operating the shooting
range."
A divided Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and
upheld the granting of the permanent injunction. 7 The court held that
MERA specifically gives members of the public standing to bring civil
actions to enjoin harmful conduct even when no applicable standards
have been promulgated by the state or by any of its administrative
agencies."' A formal balancing test, analagous to the test traditionally
used by courts of equity, was adopted to be utilized by the trial courts
in resolving suits for injunctive relief brought under MERA."' In utiliz-
at 769 with id. at 780-82.
In Bryson I the supreme court reversed and remanded a district court decision that had
denied relief to a landowner whose property was being taken by a county for highway
construction purposes. The court found that the landowner had established a prima facie
case under MERA by showing a protectable natural resource (a natural wildlife marsh)
and that the county's action would materially adversely affect that resource. See 297
Minn. at 228, 210 N.W.2d at 297. On remand, the trial court refused to enjoin construction
across the marsh, because the county had changed the route to cross the marsh on an
adjoining farmer's land. See Bryson II, 309 Minn. 178, 179, 183-84, 243 N.W.2d 316, 317,
319 (1976). On appeal, the supreme court again reversed the trial court, holding that
because the landowner had shown a prudent and feasible alternative to construction
across the marsh, regardless of where such construction was to take place, the trial court
must enjoin the environmentally destructive conduct. See id. at 187, 243 N.W.2d at 321.
14. See 257 N.W.2d at 781, 782. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1976) provides that "the
defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evidence to the con-
trary."
15. See 257 N.W.2d at 782. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1976) provides:
The defendant may also show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is
no feasible and prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is consistent with
and reasonably required for promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare
in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its air, water, land
and other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction. Eco-
nomic considerations alone shall not constitute a defense hereunder.
Use of the affirmative defense is limited to cases that do not involve alleged violations of
regulations, rules, licenses, permits, or standards issued by the Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency or the Departments of Agriculture, Health, or Natural Resources. When
violation of those agencies' standards are alleged, the defendant may rebut only by con-
trary evidence. See MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.03(1), .04 (1976).
16. See 257 N.W.2d at 767.
17. See id. at 782-83.
18. See id. at 771 n.6.
19. See id. at 782. For a general discussion of equitable balancing, see W. DE FUNIAK,
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY § 25 (2d ed. 1956). The doctrine of equitable balancing has
been stated as follows:
[Tlhe court will weigh the loss, injury, or hardship resulting to the respective
parties from granting or withholding equitable relief; that if the loss resulting
to the plaintiff from denying the equitable relief will be slight as compared to
the loss or hardship caused to the defendant if the injunction is granted, the
equitable relief will be denied.
19791
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ing the White Bear balancing test, a trial court must weigh the utility
of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of any resulting environ-
mental harm.10 Therefore, according to the majority, the White Bear
trial court acted properly when it balanced the recreational benefits of
the trap-and-skeet range against its interference with protected natural
resources.
2'
Three justices, dissenting from the decision, argued that the trial
court should have adopted objective noise standards for the area in
question before determining whether the effects of the defendant's con-
duct were material and adverse." These standards, to be established on
a case-by-case basis, would be founded upon evidence submitted by the
plaintiffs, who would then be required to show that the defendant vio-
lated the adopted standards.? The dissenting justices also argued that
granting a permanent injunction in White Bear was an unnecessarily
harsh remedy, because the trial court could have reconciled the compet-
ing interests of the parties by allowing the shooting range to operate
under noise and shot restrictions.
2
The basis for the balancing test adopted by the court is unclear.
MERA does not prescribe the use of a balancing test and such broad
balancing would appear to exceed the scope of the affirmative defense.2
Id. at 43. When a substantial right of the plaintiff is endangered by the defendant's
threatened or actual conduct, however, many courts have granted injunctions even though
the hardship on the defendant exceeds the dollar value of the benefit to the plaintiff. Id.
de Funiak also notes another qualification of the rule when an injunction would affect
public convenience or rights, but does not consider the reverse possibility of an injunction
to protect public interests or rights. See id. at 45. One must recognize that equitable
balancing, arising as it did in trespass and nuisance actions, was applied frequently as a
doctrine to limit the granting of injunctions in such cases. See McClintock, Discretion to
Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nuisance, 12 MINN. L. REv. 565, 569-70 (1928).
20. See 257 N.W.2d at 782.
21. See id. at 782-83.
22. See id. at 785, 790. Although the Pollution Control Agency has the authority to
develop impulsive noise standards, see MINN. STAT. § 116.07(2) (1976), standards have not
yet been promulgated. See 257 N.W.2d at 771 & n.6, 784-85.
23. See 257 N.W.2d at 785.
24. See id. at 788, 790. In his dissent, Justice Kelly agreed with the majority's use of a
balancing approach, stating that MERA should not be implemented mechanically, on the
basis that the Act gives courts the discretion to balance the value of protecting our natural
resources against any competing social value in the defendant's conduct. "In this respect,
decisions under the act are not unlike traditional nuisance cases, but with the difference
that the act instructs us as to the greater weight to be given environmental values." Id.
at 790 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
25. See note 15 supra. It is difficult to reconcile the terms of the affirmative defense
(conduct for which there is no prudent, feasible alternative and which promotes public
health, welfare, and safety) with the general language used by the court in White Bear
(utility of the defendant's conduct). But see Note, supra note 1, at 600 (If the conduct
materially adversely affects the lake, "the affirmative defense is not incongruous with
prior Minnesota law. In deciding whether the defense has been satisfied, as well as if there
is, in fact, pollution, the courts will be balancing many of the considerations which they
[Vol. 5
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The absence of "elaborate standards to guide trial courts" in MERA
provided the court with a basis to infer that the Legislature intended to
permit the courts to give substance to the statute." As support for this
position, the court cited Ray v. Mason County Drain Commissioner, 7 a
Michigan Supreme Court decision interpreting the Michigan Environ-
mental Protection Act.' That statute served as the model for environ-
mental rights acts in Minnesota and other states." In Ray the Michigan
Supreme Court held that the Michigan Act permits the courts to de-
velop a "common law of environmental quality" and to fashion stan-
dards on a case-by-case basis in the context of actual problems."' But
neither Ray nor other Michigan cases suggest the application of a formal
balancing test. 3' Nevertheless, the Minnesota court used the broad lan-
have taken into account in the past in deciding whether a nuisance has been commit-
ted.").
26. See 257 N.W.2d at 782 & n.12.
27. 393 Mich. 294, 224 N.W.2d 883 (1975), noted in Comment, Three Recent Cases:
State Environmental Protection Acts Revisited, 1975 DET. C.L. REv. 265, 271-80.
28. MICH. Coup. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1978). The Michigan Act
has been reviewed extensively. For a legislative history of its enactment, see Note,
Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 U. MICH. J.L. Rai. 358 (1970). Cases brought
under the Act are discussed in Haynes, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act in its
Sixth Year: Substantive Environmental Law from Citizen Suits, 53 J. URB. L. 589 (1976);
Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70
MICH. L. Rav. 1003 (1972); Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years'
Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 Ecot.ov L.Q. 1 (1974).
29. Compare CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12600-12612 (West Supp. 1978) and CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (West 1975) and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403,412 (West 1973) and IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to -6 (Bums 1973) and MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (West
Supp. 1978) and MtNN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (1976) and NEV. Rav. STAT. §§ 41.540-.570
(1975) and N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-1 to -14 (West Supp. 1978) and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 34A-10-1 to -15 (1977) with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West
Supp. 1978). See generally DiMento, Citizen Environmental Legislation in the States: An
Overview, 53 J. Us. L. 413 (1976) (discussing state acts); DiMento, Citizen Environmen-
tal Litigation and the Administrative Process: Empirical Findings, Remaining Issues and
a Direction for Future Research, 1977 DUKE L.J. 409 (discussing administrative effect of
acts).
30. See 393 Mich. at 306-07, 224 N.W.2d at 888.
31. Ray speaks only in general terms of the role that the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act gives to the courts-the development of a substantive common law of
environmental quality. See id. In a more recent case the Michigan Court of Appeals has
stated that the Michigan Act will supersede the common law of nuisance to the extent
that there is any conflict between the respective bodies of law. See Wayne County Dep't
of Health v. Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich. App. 668, 693, 263 N.W.2d 778, 791 (1977).
The Michigan courts, in any action brought under the Michigan Act, may examine the
validity, applicability, and reasonableness of any pertinent standard set by any instru-
mentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof. If the court finds the
standard deficient, it is empowered to adopt its own standard to apply at the trial. See
MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 691.1202, subd. 2(2) (West Supp. 1978). In contrast, MERA
provides a separate civil action to challenge agency standards or regulations, see MINN.
STAT. § 116B. 10(1) (1976), but prohibits suits against persons for acts conducted pursuant
19791
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guage from Ray to support its own development of a common law of
environmental quality under MERA. 2 This common law now includes
the use of a balancing test.
3 3
The need for the balancing test is questionable because MERA al-
ready appears to provide adequate safeguards for the environment. Ac-
cording to a previous Minnesota decision, a prima facie case under
MERA is established by showing that the defendant's conduct would
pollute, impair, or destroy a protected resource." Once a prima facie
case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant either to rebut
the plaintiffs prima facie case by using contrary evidence or to establish
MERA's affirmative defense. 5 To establish the affirmative defense the
defendant must show both that there is no prudent and feasible alterna-
tive to the conduct sought to be enjoined, and, additionally, that the
conduct promotes the public health, safety, and welfare .3 If a prudent
to standards or regulations promulgated by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, or
by the Departments of Agriculture, Health, or Natural Resources. See id. § 116B.03(1).
While the Minnesota law protects individuals who have acted in good faith pursuant
to certain agency regulations, it does not specifically grant authority to the courts to adopt
their own standards. The dissenters in White Bear called for the court to adopt a standard
procedure for trial courts to use in actions where no state standards are applicable, similar
to the standards established by the Michigan court in Olsonite, but the majority opinion
does not recognize this problem. See 257 N.W.2d at 785, 790. Instead, by creation of the
balancing test, the majority opinion addressed the overall function of a trial court in
actions brought under MERA, not the procedures to be applied in determining whether a
prima facie case has been established. See id. at 782.
32. See 257 N.W.2d at 782 & n.12. In Ray, land6wners in a watershed district sought
to enjoin the drain commissioner from continuing with a flood control project that alleg-
edly caused "substantial forms of environmental degradation." See 393 Mich. at 299, 301,
224 N.W.2d at 884-85. The trial court ruled against plaintiffs' claim, which was brought
under Michigan's Environmental Protection Act. See id. at 298, 224 N.W.2d at 884. The
Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case for more complete and specific findings of
fact, which the court held were required under both the Act and Michigan's rules of court.
See id. at 303, 224 N.W.2d at 887. The court discussed what the Act requires to be included
in the findings of fact: whether a prima facie case is established; whether defendant's
conduct results in pollution, impairment, or destruction of natural resources; whether the
case has been rebutted by contrary evidence; and whether defendant has established the
affirmative defense allowed under the Act. See id. at 308-09, 224 N.W.2d at 889.
33. See 257 N.W.2d at 782 & n.12.
34. See Bryson I, 297 Minn. 218, 228, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (1973). For a discussion of
the Bryson I decision, see note 13 supra.
35. Bryson 1, 297 Minn. 218, 229, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297-98 (1973).
36. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1976). As an affirmative defense, the defendant may show
that there is no feasible and prudent alternative. If he meets this burden of proof, the
defendant must demonstrate further that his conduct is "consistent with and reasonably
required for promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of the state's
paramount concern for the protection of its. . . natural resources." Id. If the defendant's
activity promotes the public welfare by providing employment, the economic impact of
enjoining his conduct might be weighed against the environmental impact of permitting
him to continue polluting. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 841 (Minn.
1977) ("1 SItate agencies and courts are required by statute to consider both the economic
[Vol. 5
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and feasible alternative is shown to exist 37 or if the conduct does not
promote the public health, safety, and welfare,31 the environmentally
destructive conduct must be enjoined. Therefore MERA would appear
to adequately address the state's paramount concern for protection of
the environment without the use of a formal balancing test.
The court in White Bear failed to specify when the balancing test is
to be applied. At least four different uses for the balancing test exist.
First, the trial court could balance the utility of the defendant's conduct
against the potential environmental harm to determine whether the
adverse effects on natural resources are material, 39 thus constituting
pollution, impairment, or destruction as defined by MERA. Materiality,
however, is essentially a factual determination that should not include
the subjective factors of balancing. 0 Balancing at a later time, after the
prima facie case has been established, seems logically more sound and
still gives broad discretion to the trial court, as was apparently intended
by the supreme court in White Bear."
A second alternative would be to employ the balancing test when
weighing the evidence submitted by the defendant to rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie case. But determining how much weight should be
given to conflicting evidence, like determining whether harmful conduct
impact and the environmental impact . . . . It is only where the likelihood of danger to
the public is remote and speculative that economic impacts which are devastating and
certain may be weighed in the balance to arrive at an environmentally sound decision.").
37. See Bryson II, 309 Minn. 178, 187, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321 (1976).
38. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1976).
39. The Sierra Club, as amicus curiae, submitted a brief to the court in White Bear
suggesting that the trial court had exercised its discretion appropriately at this point in
determining whether the adverse effects were indeed material. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
Sierra Club at 21-23, 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977). Although the court appears to draw
upon that brief in its opinion, it did not state expressly that balancing would be employed
solely to determine whether the adverse effect was material and thus in violation of
MERA. Compare id. with 257 N.W.2d at 781-82. As stated in notes 40-41 infra and
accompanying text, balancing at this point in the trial appears to be unsound.
40. In White Bear the court states that the word "materially" as used in MERA carries
the same effect and meaning as the word "substantially." See 257 N.W.2d at 782 n.11.
Permitting balancing to be used to determine whether a prima facie case has been made,
that is, whether the defendant's conduct substantially affects protected resources, invites
what would appear to be a logically unsound result. Through balancing a court could find,
in a case in which a project has great social and economic utility, that there was no
materially adverse effect even though the resource may be significantly affected or de-
stroyed.
41. See 257 N.W.2d at 782. The court held:
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act does not prescribe elaborate stan-
dards to guide trial courts, but allows a case-by-case determination by use of a
balancing test, analogous to the one traditionally employed by courts of equity,
where the utility of a defendant's conduct which interferes with and invades
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is material, is a factual determination. Therefore, introduction of the
subjective factors of the balancing test also would be inappropriate at
this point.
As a third alternative, the balancing test could be used to evaluate
the affirmative defense. This approach finds little support in Minnesota
law, however.4" Minnesota decisions, both prior and subsequent to
White Bear, have construed the statutory language "prudent and feasi-
ble alternative" in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of similar language in a federal statute.43 According to
these decisions, the language is not intended to give the fact-finder a
wide range of discretion through the use of a balancing test." Further-
more MERA requires that environmentally destructive conduct be en-
joined when a prudent and feasible alternative is shown to exist.4 5 There-
fore, although a trial court may have discretion in its consideration of
what will constitute a prudent and feasible alternative, balancing the
utility of a defendant's conduct against the harm would appear to ex-
ceed the scope of that determination.
Finally the court could take advantage of the balancing test adopted
in White Bear in attempting to determine what relief should be
granted." This use of the balancing test seems to be the most appropri-
42. See Bryson II, 309 Minn. 178, 187, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321 (1976); cf. People for
Environmental Enlightenment & Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Environmen-
tal Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 870 (Minn. 1978) (balancing under Minnesota Power
Plant Siting Act limited by MERA to consideration.of noncompensable human damage).
Language relating to balancing under MERA in the Bryson I decision is more general but
does not specifically espouse a broad balancing under the Act. See Bryson I, 297 Minn.
218, 228, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (1973).
43. Compare PEER, Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d
858, 869-70 (Minn. 1978) and Bryson I, 309 Minn. 178, 186-87, 243 N.W.2d 316, 320-21
(1976) with Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In
Overton Park Tennessee citizens and local conservation organizations brought an action
against the Secretary of Transportation, alleging that he had violated federal statutes in
approving acquisition of parkland near Memphis for highway construction. The Supreme
Court held that the Secretary did not have discretion under the Department of Transpor-
tation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §
1653(f) (1970)) to perform a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests in determining
whether to acquire parkland for highway construction, see 401 U.S. at 411, and remanded
the action to the district court for review of the Secretary's decision. See id. at 420.
44. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1971);
PEER, Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 869-70 (Minn.
1978); Bryson II, 309 Minn. 178, 186-87, 243 N.W.2d 316, 320-21 (1976).
45. Bryson II, 309 Minn. 178, 187, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321 (1976).
46. In Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
1975), modified on other grounds sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th
Cir. 1976), the court found that Reserve's air and water discharges endangered public
health and justified preventive action. 514 F.2d at 535. However, the court adopted a
balancing approach to determine what relief was appropriate: "In fashioning relief in a
case such as this involving a possibility of future harm, a court should strike a proper
balance between the benefits conferred and the hazards created by Reserve's facility." Id.
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ate. MERA specifically grants discretion to the courts in determining
what form the remedy will take. 7 Similarly, equitable balancing is al-
ready used by the courts in traditional nuisance and trespass cases to
determine whether injunctive relief should be granted." Applying the
balancing test in determining what kind of relief would be appropriate
under MERA, therefore, both comports with the language of MERA and
parallels the application of equity's balancing test in other areas of the
law.
However the issue of when to apply the balancing test is resolved, the
question remains whether use of the test actually will provide additional
protection to the state's natural resources. Unlike the circumscribed
consideration that the trial court makes in determining the validity of
the affirmative defense under MERA,19 a broad consideration of the
utility of a defendant's conduct results from the use of a balancing test.
This broad consideration may give greater weight and protection to a
defendant's actions than apparently was intended by MERA. A trial
court could find that the value of a defendant's conduct outweighs any
harm to the natural resources, even though the harm is material and
adverse, and therefore refuse to enjoin the harmful conduct. One of the
dissenting justices noted this fact, emphasizing that use of the balancing
test in White Bear should have resulted in a remedy less severe than a




The broad balancing test-weighing the utility of a defendant's con-
duct against any resulting environmental harm-adopted by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in White Bear has become a part of the common
law developed under MERA. In applying this balancing test and in
determining whether conduct "materially adversely affects" natural
resources, the trial courts are likely to play an active role in the future
development of substantive environmental quality standards under
MERA. Both the majority, in preparing its own standard for trial courts
to apply in resolving environmental actions brought under MERA, and
the dissenters, in supporting the creation of objective pollution stan-
47. MINN. STAT. § 116B.07 (1976) provides: "The court may grant declaratory relief,
temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose such conditions upon a party
as are necessary or appropriate to protect the air, water, land or other natural resources
located within the state from pollution, impairment or destruction." (emphasis added).
48. See generally Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wash. 2d 24, 145 P.2d 552 (1944) (allowing
operation of an outdoor theatre under noise restrictions); Keeton & Morris, Notes on
"Balancing the Equities," 18 Tax. L. REv. 412 (1940); McClintock, supra note 19.
49. The statute emphasizes the paramount considerations to be given to protection of
state natural resources and limits the use of economic considerations in the affirmative
defense. Furthermore, the defendant must focus on the absence of any prudent and feasi-
ble alternative rather than stressing the benefits or utility of his actions. See MINN. STAT.
§ 116B.04 (1976).
50. See 257 N.W.2d at 791 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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dards for each case, have indicated a willingness to involve both levels
of courts in the development of substantive environmental quality stan-
dards. In assuming an active role in the area, the supreme court would
be wise to consider further development of the trial court's role in cases
under MERA, particularly in resolving the issue of when the White Bear
balancing test should be applied.
Remedies-DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS OF AN UNESTABLISHED Busi-
NESs-Leoni v. Bemis Co., - Minn. -, 255 N.W.2d 824 (1977).
A growing acceptance of present day business methods of predicting
future profitability' has resulted in a substantial liberalization of the
former general rule that damages could not be recovered for the lost
profits of an unestablished business. This denial of recovery is based on
the doctrine of certainty; damages for breach of contract cannot be
speculative, remote, or conjectural.3 Originally, even the lost profits of
an established business were considered inherently too uncertain to be
awarded in either a tort or contract action.' Courts began to modify this
absolute exclusion by stating that lost profits could be recovered if
three prerequisites were satisfied: the loss was caused by the breach,5
1. See generally C. ALMON, AmERIcAN ECONOMY TO 1975 (1966); Denning, New Look at
Business Forecasts, 64 NATION'S Bus. 48 (1976); Wheelwright & Clarke, Corporate fore-
casting: promise and reality, 54 HAav. Bus. Rxv. 40 (1976).
The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 331, Comment b (1932) defines profits as "the net
pecuniary gain from a transaction, the gross pecuniary gains diminished by the cost of
obtaining them." See King Features Syndicate v. Courrier, 241 Iowa 870, 882, 43 N.W.2d
718, 726 (1950). See also Swaney v. Derragon, 281 Mich. 142, 143-44, 274 N.W. 741, 741
(1937).
2. Formerly, damages could not be recovered for any loss of profits, even though the
business was established. W. HALE & R. CooLagY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 32
(2d ed. 1912). Exceptions to the complete denial rule began to appear in the mid-
nineteenth century. See, e.g., Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61, 72 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1845) (profits directly attributable to contract, but not profits from further transac-
tions with third parties, held recoverable); cf. Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power
Co., 281 Minn. 43, 46, 160 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1968)(recognizing unestablished business
rule). See also D. Dons, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes v. Lazere, 301 Minn. 462, 467, 222
N.W.2d 799, 803 (1974); Olson v. Naymark, 177 Minn. 383, 384, 225 N.W. 275, 275 (1929);
Note, Damages-Loss of Profits Caused by Breach of Contract-Proof of Certainty, 17
MNN. L. REv. 194 (1933).
4. See R. BAuER, EssENTIALS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 75, at 160 n.1 (1919). See also
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 551 (1863) (allowance of profits as damages less limited
in tort action than in breach of contract action).
5. The requirement of causation is outside the scope of this comment. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has recognized, however, the causation requirement. See Faust v. Parrott,
270 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 1978) (in breach of noncompete clause action, plaintiff's lost
profits must be caused by breach; possibility of poor management, market changes, and
change of business name to be considered as possible alternative causes); Northern Petro-
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